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ABSTRACT  
In England, the dominant policy narrative recognises no association between spending on children’s services and 
quality and a limited association between quality and deprivation. We combined 374 inspection outcomes between 
2011 and 2019 with data on preventative and safeguarding expenditure and Indices of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) 
scores. A multilevel logistic regression model predicting ‘good’ or ‘outstanding’ judgements suggests each £100 
increase in preventative spending per child was associated with a 69 per cent increase (95% CI: 27.5%, 124%) in 
the odds of a positive inspection. A one-decile increase in deprivation was associated with a 16 per cent (95% CI: 
-25%, -5.7%) decrease. Safeguarding expenditure was not associated with outcomes. Deprived communities have 
worse access to good-quality children’s services and government policies that have increased poverty and 
retrenched preventative services have likely exacerbated this inequality. Further, inattention to socioeconomic 
context in inspections raises concerns about their use in ‘take over’ policies.  
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Austerity policies, retrenchment, and decentralisation have affected the quality and availability 
of public services in inequitable ways over the past decade (Webb & Bywaters, 2018; 
Hernandez, 2021). Children’s services in England devote resources to supporting families of 
children who may develop health or developmental impairments and safeguard children who 
may be at risk of maltreatment. They are also responsible for arranging care placements and 
care-leaving support for children who are not able to live with their families of origin.  
There has been renewed international interest in studies that view children’s services through 
a public health and inequalities lens; these studies show that children living in more deprived 
communities are far more likely to: require additional child welfare support; experience abuse 
or neglect; become subject to child protection investigations; and be placed in care (Sethi, et 
al. 2013; Bywaters, et al. 2016; Doidge, et al. 2017; Bywaters, et al. 2018; Webb, et al. 2020). 
As adults, they are at higher risk of mortality and other adverse outcomes than the general 
population (Gypen, et al., 2017; Murray, et al., 2020; van IJzendoorn, et al., 2020; Jackisch, et 
al., 2021). There is also evidence of an ‘inverse care law’ for children’s services in England 
similar to that found in medical care (Tudor Hart, 1971), an inverse relationship between 
intervention rates and population needs (Bywaters, et al., 2018; Webb, et al., 2020).  
Such studies highlight the potential of proactively addressing demand- and supply-side 
determinants of intervention (Bywaters, et al., 2018; Webb, et al., 2020; Hood, et al., 2020a). 
Remedying structural inequalities; alleviating or eliminating root causes of child abuse and 
neglect, principal among them being poverty; and developing community-led infrastructures 
of family support can prevent the escalation of need or risk (Featherstone, et al., 2018). This 
reflects wider calls to invest in preventive services to improve the support offered to children 
and families, deinstitutionalise children, and reduce health inequalities (van IJzendoorn, et al., 
2020; Goldman, et al., 2020).  




This section introduces literature on the relationship between incidence of child welfare 
interventions, poverty, and the funding of children’s services in England. We present existing 
evidence on the relationship between poverty, public services expenditure, and children’s 
services quality before discussing some political implications of inspections of children’s 
services quality. 
 
Socioeconomic determinants of incidence 
Existing literature has primarily focused on inequalities in child maltreatment incidence – 
typically approximated by children’s services interventions and substantiation of abuse – rather 
than the quality of services that prevent maltreatment (Hood, et al., 2016). Lower intervention 
rates may not necessarily reflect prevented abuse or neglect, they could equally reflect more 
‘missed’ maltreatment, especially in poor quality services. They might also represent changes 
in local and national policy that shift thresholds for intervention, effectively rationing services 
(Hood, et al., 2016; Devaney, 2019; Hood, et al., 2020a). The same can be true of higher 
intervention rates. Poor quality services may operate on unreasonably low levels of risk 
tolerance; this may lead to worse social and health outcomes for children than if they had not 
been subject to state intervention (Featherstone, et al., 2018; Murray, et al., 2020; Jackisch, et 
al., 2021). It is important to understand both incidence and quality in child welfare. 
Cuts to welfare benefits beginning in 2010 have disproportionately affected families with 
children (Tucker, 2017; Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2020). A growing body of literature has 
identified causal relationships between income, poverty, and child abuse and neglect 
(Bywaters, et al., 2016). This relationship creates a ‘social gradient’ in the incidence of child 
welfare interventions, whereby poorer families are increasingly likely have children living in 
out-of-home care (Bywaters, et al., 2018). While there are differences among countries, this is 
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a global phenomenon observable in the United Kingdom (ibid; Webb, et al., 2020), the USA 
(Eckenrode, et al., 2014; Drake & Jonson-Reid, 2014), Canada (Esposito, et al., 2017), 
Australia (Doidge, et al., 2017), and Aotearoa New Zealand (Keddell, et al., 2019). Studies in 
England by Hood, et al. (2020a) and Webb, et al. (2020a) have shown that these inequalities 
are embedded in the child welfare system at the stage of referral and in ‘child in need’ 
designations under Section 17 of the Children Act 1989. The social gradient typically gets 
steeper as the severity of state intervention approaches care entry.  
Where poverty creates demand for services, the supply to meet demand depends on central 
funding. Funding of services has become less proportionate to underlying levels of need under 
austerity (Webb & Bywaters, 2018). Early help services have been heavily and inequitably 
defunded in the 2010 decade, with the greatest reductions being over 50 per cent per child 
between 2010 and 2015 (Webb & Bywaters, 2018; YMCA, 2020; Action for Children, 2020). 
These services typically include some combination of ‘early intervention’ and ‘family support’ 
(Frost, et al., 2015). The former might include specific interventions like parenting 
programmes, such as ‘Triple-P’ (Sanders, 2008) and the latter might include community 
development social work (Jack & Gill, 2010).  
Hood, et al. (2020b) found that early help services had shifted towards more complex forms of 
‘late-early’ intervention as a response to funding cuts, diminishing the capacity of local 
authorities to resolve more universal needs. This shift away from open-door provision has been 
reported nationally (Action for Children, 2020). Recent research has identified that cuts to these 
services are causally associated with increases in the rates of children in need and 16-17 year 
olds in care (Webb, 2021; Bennett, et al. 2021). While a £14million investment in ‘Family 
Hubs’ (Department for Education, 2021a) has been proposed, this funding, if split evenly, 
would equate to only 0.58 per cent of the average that each authority has cut from their family 
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support expenditure between 2010 and 2019 (author’s analysis, Department for Education, 
2021b). 
 
POVERTY, ‘EARLY HELP’, AND FAILURE DEMAND 
The concept of ‘failure demand’ in systems-thinking approaches to public services is of 
increasing relevance to children’s services (Seddon, 2008; Munro, 2010; Hood, 2015). Failure 
demand is defined as ‘demand caused by a failure to do something or do something right for 
the customer’ (Seddon & Brand, 2008: 8). In relation to children’s services, Hood (2015: 10) 
writes: ‘issues that are not resolved straightaway keep reappearing and cumulatively start to 
overload the system’s ability to cope’. This type of demand is theorised to arise from a failure 
to ‘intervene quickly and efficiently at the point that families start to experience problems’ 
(Hood, 2015: 10); a limited capacity to respond to a wide variety of needs (ibid; Wastell, 2011; 
Wastell & White, 2014); the arrangement of socio-technical systems (Broadhurst, et al., 2010; 
Gibson & O'Donovan, 2013); a defensive approach towards both family and institutional risk 
(Munro, 2010; Hood, 2015); and a technocratic focus on key performance metrics and 
proceduralism (Broadhurst, et al., 2010; Wastell & White, 2014; Hood, 2015; Hood, et al., 
2016). Even when not explicitly stated, failure demand is often implicated in what has been 
called the ‘care crisis’ in the child welfare system. This is neatly illustrated in the title to the 
All Party Parliamentary Group for Children and National Children’s Bureau’s (2018) inquiry 
report on the subject: ‘Storing Up Trouble’. 
The prevalence of poverty (demand) and the lack of availability and diversity of early help 
(supply) can be hypothesised to be predictors of the quality of children’s services. Both factors 
are theorised to create failure demand, which can mean that the services provided to families 
to prevent maltreatment and abuse can be inappropriate, untimely, or, at worst, unavailable. As 
such, children’s services quality can be linked to national policy. Placing local services under 
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quality inspection without attention to the impact of geographical inequalities in poverty and 
funding, then expecting them to have equal capabilities of achieving the same levels of quality, 
therefore becomes problematic. This is especially concerning when the consequence of failing 
to meet adequate standards can mean the removal of public ownership and dramatic reform of 
services that, if the underlying needs of their population and service were properly met through 
national policy, might not have been needed.  
 
SOCIOECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF CHILDREN’S SERVICES QUALITY IN ENGLAND 
The Office for Standards in Education, Children’s Services, and Skills (Ofsted) is responsible 
for regulating the quality of local authority children’s services in England through inspections, 
which typically include a mixture of observational fieldwork, case audits, and analysis of key 
performance indicators assessed against an inspection framework. Ofsted inspections result in 
a published judgement or ‘grade’ for children’s services. Prior to 2013, these ranged through 
‘inadequate’, ‘adequate’, ‘good’, and ‘outstanding’. Since the introduction of the Single 
Inspection of LA Children Services Framework (SIF) in 2013, the ‘adequate’ outcome category 
was replaced with the ‘requires improvement to be good’ category. While the validity of Ofsted 
inspection judgements and the extent to which they reflect good-quality outcomes for children 
remains a point of considerable contention (La Valle, et al., 2016; Hood, 2019), inspection 
judgements are the only national, publicly available and broadly comparable measure of local 
authority children’s services quality in England. Moreover, the results of Ofsted inspections 
have very real consequences for services and families and for the provision of children’s 
services more generally (Jones, 2019). For example, Hood, et al. (2016) found that in the year 
following an ‘inadequate’ Ofsted outcome, services tended to make greater use of more 
intrusive and resource intensive child protection interventions. 
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A limited number of studies address the association between Ofsted judgements and either 
socioeconomic deprivation, a principal demand factor, or, at the level of supply, service 
funding. The National Audit Office (NAO) in two separate reports on children’s social care 
found no association between children’s services expenditure and service quality (National 
Audit Office, 2016, 2019). Ofsted later claimed that “inadequacy is not a function of size, 
deprivation or funding, but of the quality of leadership and management” (Ofsted, 2016). 
Prompted by the publication of statistics that reported deprived local authorities with positive 
inspections had around 21 per cent higher expenditure per child than those with ‘inadequate’ 
or ‘requires improvement’ outcomes (Bywaters, et al., 2017), Ofsted included an admission 
that there may be a link between deprivation and children’s services inspection outcomes but 
rejected any link between spending and outcomes (Ofsted, 2017). Analysing inspections from 
two different Ofsted inspection frameworks, Wilkins & Antonopoulou (2020a, 2020b) reached 
similar conclusions: they found an association between deprivation and quality but not between 
spending and quality.  
These studies used either total expenditure per child or ‘social work expenditure’ as predictors 
of inspection outcomes. The NAO’s 2016 report used an undefined aggregate of children’s 
services spending, a subset of safeguarding expenditure, which usually accounts for less than 
a third of all expenditure on average. Their 2019 report, and the research by Wilkins & 
Antonopoulou (2020a, 2020b), used total expenditure per child.  No study has assessed the link 
between spending and quality of services while distinguishing between preventative and acute 
spend. This is potentially important, given the strong evidence-base for the effectiveness of 
early intervention in reducing child maltreatment (Yousafzai, 2020) and the specific role that 
early help and family support spending plays in reducing ‘failure demand’ (Hood, 2015). The 
studies also only consider inspections from only one inspection framework at a time. While 
this side-steps problems caused by the lack of independence of errors within judgements of the 
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same local authority and inspection framework over time, it curtails the power of models to 
identify multiple or small-to-moderate effects (Button, et al., 2013). To our knowledge, studies 
using analytical approaches such as multilevel models that can utilise larger samples while 
incorporating hierarchical dependence have not been published. Such models are necessary for 
accurately assessing predictors of Ofsted outcome in pooled inspection data as changes in 
framework have often been accompanied by changes in the inspectorate’s propensity to rate 
services as ‘Good’ or ‘Outstanding’. For instance, under the SIF, 34.9 per cent of inspection 
outcomes were ‘Good’ (32.9%) or ‘Outstanding’ (2%) (author’s analysis). Under the 
Inspecting Local Authority Children’s Services (ILACS) framework 56.1 per cent of outcomes 
were ‘Good’ (43.9%) or ‘Outstanding’ (12.2%) (author’s analysis). 
 
THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF CHILDREN’S SERVICES QUALITY 
Kim & Warner (2021) report that local government responses to fiscal austerity have opened 
up publicly-controlled services to marketisation. Given the uneven nature of the cuts to 
children’s services, this creates a more fundamental concern about geographical inequalities in 
the relationship between citizens and the state along the lines of socioeconomic class. Since 
2015, children’s services deemed to be of ‘inadequate’ quality can be subject to ‘take over’ 
(Stevenson, 2015; Jones, 2019). This policy reform was explained by a government 
spokesperson in 2015 as ‘a formalised academy-style system … any local authority judged as 
inadequate by Ofsted has to show significant improvement within six months or be taken over’ 
(Stevenson, 2015).  
To date, nine local children’s services have been removed from public control and replaced 
with independent trusts, with a tenth service poised to be taken over; approximately 6.5 per 
cent of all children’s services covering approximately 8 per cent of the child population since 
the policy reform was introduced (Turner, 2020a). Almost half of these local authorities: 
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Doncaster, Sunderland, Sandwell, and Birmingham, are in the most deprived 20 per cent of all 
local authorities in England according to the Indices of Multiple Deprivation 2019 (Ministry 
of Housing, Communities & Local Government, 2019). The remaining local authorities: 
Slough, Northamptonshire, Kingston upon Thames (now merged with Richmond upon 
Thames), and West Sussex, all reported severe fiscal pressures and risk of insolvency as a result 
of austerity policies and central government underfunding prior to conversion to independent 
children’s trusts (Rutter, 2018; Vise, 2019; Robson & Manning, 2020; Turner, 2020b; Powling, 
2020). If poverty and service funding are significant determinants of children’s services quality 
and a consequence of government policy and factors outside local authority control, such a 
policy may be inappropriate. 
 
DATA  
Outcomes from 415 Ofsted inspections of local authority children’s services in England over 
eight fiscal years, between 1st April 2011 and 31st March 2019 (Ofsted, 2020), were linked to 
local authority data on children’s services expenditure (Department for Education, 2021b) over 
the same period, and to Index of Multiple Deprivation scores (Ministry of Housing, 
Communities & Local Government, 2019a). These data are nested within 152 upper-tier local 
authorities that provide children’s services across England. Re-inspections over the study 
period (N=31) were excluded from the analysis. Four inspections of the City of London and 
the Isles of Scilly were removed; these outlier local authorities are commonly excluded in local 
area studies due to their small resident populations. Inspections from the short-lived Targeted 
Looked After Children (TLAC) framework for children in care, which resulted in only five 
published outcomes, were also excluded. One authority had no spending data available to 
match to Safeguarding and Looked After Children Inspections (SLAC) inspection due to a 
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local authority merger, and was excluded. The final number of inspections included  
was 374.  
‘Overall judgements’ or ‘overall effectiveness’ ratings from Ofsted inspections are based on 
four-tiers of outcomes: ‘inadequate’, ‘requires improvement to be good’, ‘good’, and 
‘outstanding’. Our sample included 74 ‘inadequate’ overall judgements (19.8%), 166 ‘requires 
improvement’ overall judgements (44.4%), 121 ‘good’ overall judgements (32.4%), and 
thirteen ‘outstanding’ judgements (3.5%). Four inspection frameworks were used by Ofsted 
between 2009 and 2019 excluding the TLAC. The first was the Safeguarding and Looked After 
Children Inspections (SLAC) framework (August 2009—August 2012); followed by the Child 
Protection Inspections (CPI) framework (July 2012—August 2013); which became the Single 
Inspection of Local Authority Children Services Framework (SIF) (February 2014—August 
2019). The current framework is the Inspecting Local Authority Children’s Services (ILACS) 
framework, (from March 2018).   
 
Table 1: Ofsted inspection frameworks and domains for children’s services 





Safeguarding and Looked After 




Looked After Children Overall 
Effectiveness 





Single Inspection of LA 




Children who need help and 
protection 
 
Children looked after and 
achieving permanence 
Adoption Performance 
Experiences and progress of 
care leavers 
Leadership, management and 
governance 
 
Inspecting Local Authority 
Children’s Services (ILACS) 
Overall 
effectiveness 
Impact of leaders 
 
Experiences and progress of 
children who need help and 
protection 
Experiences and progress of 
children in care and care leavers 
Bolded judgement domains reflect inspections of children’s services quality included in analysis 
 
Webb, Bennett, & Bywaters – Austerity, poverty and children’s services quality  
 10 
 
Table 1 shows that the SLAC framework had no comparable ‘overall judgement/effectiveness’ 
inspection outcome. To create some parity of measurement over the study period, we included 
only safeguarding overall effectiveness judgements for SLAC and excluded the Looked After 
Children services overall judgements. For SIF and ILACS, we included only the overall 
judgements for the services and not the judgements for every domain. We conducted further 
statistical tests using each inspection frameworks’ domains to assess the extent to which 
judgements corresponded domains.  
We created two categories of children’s services expenditure: ‘preventative’ and 
‘safeguarding’, following established strategies for delineating spending in administrative data 
(Webb & Bywaters, 2018). The preventative category included spending on children’s centres, 
family support services, services for young people, and other children’s and families' services 
not directly related to child protection social work or children in care. Safeguarding expenditure 
incorporated all spending associated with child protection social work: child protection 
investigations, plans, and safeguarding boards. While a more detailed breakdown of spending 
categories is possible, greater specificity introduces inconsistency across local authorities and 
over time. Expenditure was adjusted for inflation using the Office for National Statistics’ 
(ONS) GDP deflator. Per capita spend was derived using ONS population estimates for 
individuals under 18 years old. Expenditure was scaled to £100’s per child and centred at mean 
values. Summary statistics are provided in table 2. 
The Indices of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) are a relative measure of area-based 
multidimensional deprivation, released approximately every five years by the Ministry of 
Housing, Communities, and Local Government (MGCLG) (Ministry of Housing, 
Communities & Local Government, 2019b). The index is constructed from seven weighted 
domains of deprivation: income deprivation (22.5%); employment deprivation (22.5%); 
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education, skills, and training deprivation (13.5%); health deprivation and disability (13.5%); 
crime (9.3%); barriers to housing and services (9.3%); and living environment deprivation 
(9.3%) (Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government, 2019a). The latest IMD 
scores, released in 2019, were calculated using data from 2015/16, and were therefore 
considered the most suitable ‘mid-point’ measure of local deprivation for this analysis. As IMD 
scores have no straightforward interpretation these were transformed into deciles, where decile 
ten represents the most deprived ten per cent of all local authorities and decile one the least 
deprived ten per cent.  
 
 
Table 2. Summary Statistics for Variables in Inspection Data 
         
Ofsted Inspection Judgement N Missing %      
Inadequate 74 0 19.8      
Requires Improvement to be Good 166 0 44.4      
Good 121 0 32.4      
Outstanding 13 0 3.5      
         
Ofsted Inspection Framework N Missing %      
SLAC 134 1 35.8      
CPI 50 0 13.4      
SIF 149 0 39.8      
ILACS 41 0 11.0      
         
Year Ending (1st April - 31st 
March) 
N Missing %      
2011 39 0 10.4      
2012 51 0 13.6      
2013 78 0 20.9      
2014 27 0 7.2      
2015 37 0 9.9      
2016 39 0 10.4      
2017 35 0 9.4      
2018 28 0 7.5      
2019 40 0 10.7      
         




Early Help & Family Support  374 1 321.2 143.0 92.8 1033.1 227.0 385.1 
Safeguarding (£) 374 1 214.4 79.6 30.5 651.5 166.8 242.9 
         
IMD Score 374 0 23.1 8.1 5.8 45.0 16.8 28.1 
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METHODS 
Multilevel logistic regression models were estimated to predict whether inspections resulted in 
‘good’ or ‘outstanding’ Ofsted judgements of overall child welfare services quality, using IMD 
score, preventative expenditure, and safeguarding expenditure as predictors. As mentioned in 
the literature review, the structure of pooled inspection data can lead to biased estimates when 
observations are not truly independent (Robson & Pevalin, 2015) — for example, when there 
are multiple inspections of a single authority or where certain years or inspection frameworks 
are associated with very different outcomes on aggregate. Local authority and year variables 
were entered into the model as random effects to adjust for this bias. Year was chosen as a way 
to capture both variation associated with time and inspection framework, which are 
intrinsically linked. A null model including only local authority and year random effects was 
estimated to test, using a Likelihood Ratio Test, whether the inclusion of expenditure per child 
and IMD decile significantly improved model fit. Model fit was assessed using predictive 
accuracy, and predicted probabilities were calculated for the effects of expenditure per child 
and IMD decile and plotted with 95 per cent confidence intervals to contextualise effect sizes.  
To assess the extent to which findings based on overall judgements (SIF, ILACS) and 
safeguarding judgements (SLAC) were applicable to other domains of inspection and across 
frameworks, we calculated Cronbach’s alpha and Gutmann’s lambda-6 values for all SLAC, 
SIF, and ILACS inspection outcomes as well as for each framework’s set of outcome domains. 
Since CPI inspections include no specific domains and only fifty inspections, they were 
excluded from these analyses. We then estimated a single-factor categorical Confirmatory 
Factor Analysis for each of the SIF and ILACS areas of inspection and calculated the Spearman 
rank correlation coefficient for the two inspection outcomes that made up the SLAC framework 
to assess domain and overall judgement communality.  
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Finally, we tested whether estimates of the effect of deprivation decile varied notably between 
different domains of multiple deprivation. Separate models using deciles from each of nine 
multiple deprivation domains were estimated. Deprivation decile effect estimates with 95 per 
cent confidence intervals were compared with results from the main model which used deciles 
derived from the composite IMD 2019 index. All analyses were conducted in R version 4.0.4. 
For reproducibility, details of all packages used, further information on model specification, 
and a copy of data and code are available from the following repository: 
https://github.com/cjrwebb/osd-repo  
FINDINGS 
THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN EXPENDITURE, DEPRIVATION, AND POSITIVE 
INSPECTION OUTCOMES 
Model results for a multilevel logistic regression model predicting ‘good’ or ‘outstanding’ 
Ofsted inspection outcomes are shown in table 2. The model had significantly better accuracy 
(77.5%) than the no-information rate (64.2%) and was a better fit to the underlying data than a 
simpler comparison model that included only local authority and year fixed effects 
(LRT=19.54, p<0.001). There was evidence of an association between expenditure on 
preventative services per child and the likelihood of a positive inspection judgement; and 
between IMD decile and the likelihood of a positive inspection judgement. All else being equal, 
an increase of £100 per child on preventative services (around 0.7 standard deviations) was 
associated with a 1.69 times increase in the odds of a ‘good’ or ‘outstanding’ inspection 
outcome (B = 0.525, 95% CI: 0.241, 0.808). A one-decile increase in IMD score (higher 
deprivation) was associated with a 16 per cent decrease in the odds of a ‘Good’ or 
‘Outstanding’ inspection outcome (B = -0.173, 95% CI: -0.287, -0.058). In contrast, there was 
no statistically significant association between safeguarding services expenditure per child and 
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the likelihood of a positive inspection outcome (B = -0.028, 95% CI: -0.422, 0.368). Local 
authority membership (𝜎 = 0.802) and year of inspection (𝜎 = 0.852) random effects indicated 
large differences in the likelihood of a positive inspection outcome depending on local 
authority and year, illustrating the need to adjust for the hierarchical structure of inspection 
data in order to accurately assess the effects of expenditure and deprivation on the quality of 
child welfare services when using pooled inspection data over time. 
 
APPLICABILITY OF FINDINGS ON INSPECTION OUTCOMES ACROSS DOMAINS OF CHILDREN’S SERVICES 
Table 4 shows the results of Cronbach’s alpha and Gutmann’s lambda-6 tests of internal 
reliability, as well as results showing communality across inspection outcome domains using 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis for frameworks where the number of domains is greater than 
two and Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients where there are only two domains. We found 
that the 12 domains of assessment across frameworks had very good internal reliability 
(𝛼=0.87, 𝜆=0.95), with the weakest internal reliability within the two SLAC assessment 
outcomes (𝛼=0.77,		𝜆=0.66). This was unsurprising given their limited number. A Spearman’s 
rho correlation confirmed that there are some significant discrepancies between SLAC 
safeguarding and SLAC looked-after children judgements (𝜌=0.678, p<0.01). By contrast, SIF 
and ILACS areas of judgement had high communality, shown by the good fit statistics of a 
one-factor CFA (SIF: TLI=1, SRMR=0.041, 𝜒! =18.07, p=0.054; ILACS: TLI=0.999, 
SRMR=0.027, 𝜒!=2.81, p=0.246). While this indicates that the findings for overall inspection 
outcomes across all frameworks are likely applicable to all domains of inspection and, 
therefore, the quality of all aspects of child welfare services, the SIF and ILACS CFA factor 
loadings and only moderate SLAC inspection correlation (𝜌=0.68) suggests that the findings 
may be slightly less applicable in the context of quality of services for children in care and care 
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leavers (SIF: Γ=0.787, ILACS: Γ=0.899), and services for adoption and post-adoption support 
(SIF: Γ=0.818). 
 
Table 3. Multilevel logistic regression model predicting the likelihood of a children’s 
services inspection resulting in a ‘good’ or ‘outstanding’ outcome by expenditure on 
preventative services per child, expenditure on safeguarding per child, and Indices of 
Multiple Deprivation decile. 
       
    95% CI  
Predictor B S.E. p Lower Higher O.R. 
Expenditure per child on prevention (£100s) 0.525 0.145 <0.001 0.241 0.808 1.690 
Expenditure per child on safeguarding (£100s) -0.028 0.202 0.892 -0.422 0.368 0.973 
IMD decile (10 = Most Deprived) -0.173 0.059 0.003 -0.287 -0.058 0.842 
       
Intercept 0.301 0.448 0.502 -0.578 1.179 1.351 
       
Random Effects 𝜎! 𝜎     
Local authority 0.643 0.802     
Year 0.723 0.852     
       
 LR p     
Likelihood Ratio Test  19.54 <0.001     
       
Confusion Matrix Actual (1) Actual 
(0) 
    
Predicted good/outstanding inspections (1) 61 11     
Predicted inadequate/RI inspections (0) 73 229     
       
 Accuracy NIR p    
Accuracy (proportion correctly classified) 0.775 0.642 <0.001    
       
B = Model estimate (log odds), S.E. = standard error, O.R. = odds ratio, CI = Parametric confidence interval, 
𝜎!	= Variance, 𝜎 = Standard deviation, NIR = No-Information Rate 
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Table 4. Internal consistency and communality across Ofsted children’s services 
inspection frameworks and areas of judgement 
      
Internal reliability  𝜶 𝝀   N1 
All frameworks and areas of judgement (12) 0.87 0.95   70 
SLAC & SIF frameworks and areas of judgement (8) 0.88 0.92   150 
SLAC only areas of judgement (2) 0.77 0.66   150 
SIF only areas of judgement (6)  0.94 0.94   150 
ILACS only areas of judgement (4) 0.95 0.95   70 
      
Spearman’s Rank Correlation  𝝆 W p  N 
SLAC safeguarding and looked after children judgements 0.678 9185 0.002  150 
      
One-factor Confirmatory Factor Analysis fit TLI SRMR 𝝌𝟐 p N 
SIF areas of judgement (8) 1 0.041 18.07 0.054 150 
ILACS areas of judgement (4) 0.999 0.027 2.81 0.246 70 
      
Factor loadings (𝚪) for one-factor categorical CFA      
SIF 𝚪 S.E. p   
Overall judgement 1.000     
Children who need help and protection 0.987 0.006 <0.001   
Children looked after and achieving permanence  0.964 0.014 <0.001   
CLA Subdomain: Adoption performance 0.818 0.035 <0.001   
CLA Subdomain: Experiences and progress of care leavers 0.787 0.042 <0.001   
Leadership, management and governance2 1.000     
      
ILACS 𝚪 S.E. p   
Overall effectiveness 1.000     
Impact of leaders 0.946 0.034 <0.001   
Experiences & progress of children who need help and protection 0.919 0.027 <0.001   
Experiences & progress of children in care and care leavers 0.899 0.043 <0.001   
      
𝛼 = Cronbach’s alpha, 𝜆 = Gutmann’s lambda-6, 𝜌 = Spearman’s rank correlation, 𝜒! = Chi-squared 
goodness-of-fit statistic; Γ = Unstandardised factor loading, S.E. = Standard error. 1Full inspection data was 
used, which included additional SLAC and ILACS inspections that were excluded from the main analysis due 




CONTEXTUALISATION OF EFFECT SIZES 
Effect sizes were contextualised by plotting the predicted probabilities for changes in each 
predictor between their minimum and maximum observed values, while holding all other 
predictors and random effects constant at their mean value.  Figure 1 shows the effect of 
expenditure on preventative services per child on the probability of an inspection resulting in 
a ‘good’ or ‘outstanding’ judgement; figure 2 shows the effect of safeguarding expenditure per 
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child on the probability of a positive inspection outcome; and figure 3 shows the effect of IMD 
decile on the likelihood of a positive inspection outcome.  
The effects are substantial; all else being equal, the predicted probability of a local authority in 
the 25th percentile of preventative spending (£227 per child) receiving a positive inspection 
outcome is around 23 per cent (95% CI: 13%, 37%) whereas the equivalent predicted 
probability for a local authority in the 75th percentile of spending (£385 per child) is 
approximately 40 per cent (95% CI: 26%, 56%). A local authority in the least deprived 10 per 
cent of all local authorities has a 53 per cent probability of their children’s services receiving a 
positive inspection outcome (95% CI: 34%, 72%), at mean levels of expenditure, whereas a 
local authority in the most deprived 10 per cent with identical levels of expenditure has a 
predicted probability of only 19 per cent (95% CI: 10%, 35%). 
 
Figure 1: Predicted probability of a ‘good’ or ‘outstanding’ inspection outcome by amount of spending 
on preventative services per child, adjusted for levels of deprivation and safeguarding spending. 
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Figure 2: Predicted probability of a ‘good’ or ‘outstanding’ inspection outcome by amount of 
spending on safeguarding services per child, adjusted for levels of deprivation and preventative 
spending. Dashed lines indicate 95% CI upper and lower bounds. 
 
Figure 3: Predicted probability of a ‘good’ or ‘outstanding’ inspection outcome by IMD decile, 
adjusted for levels of preventative and safeguarding spending. Dashed lines indicate 95% CI upper 
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SENSITIVITY TO INDICES OF MULTIPLE DEPRIVATION DOMAIN 
Table 5 and figure 4 show the extent to which the effect of deprivation differs depending on 
multiple deprivation domain used in the model in contrast to the composite Indices of Multiple 
Deprivation score. Most of the deciles of domains that shared very high (r > 0.8) correlation 
with the composite score deciles (Income, Employment, Health, Crime, and Income 
Deprivation Affecting Children; appendix table 1), with the exception of the Income 
Deprivation Affecting Older People Index, resulted in only slightly weaker estimations of the 
effect of one-unit increases in deprivation — between an 11.3 per cent and a 14 per cent 
decrease in the odds of a positive Ofsted judgement. Education, Skills & Training deprivation 
decile was strongly correlated with the composite IMD score decile (r = 0.767), but resulted in 
a slightly stronger estimated effect, a 17.8 per cent decrease in the odds of a positive Ofsted 
judgement. Barriers to housing and services domain decile was negatively correlated with the 
IMD composite score (r = -0.321) and had a negligible association with Ofsted outcome (95 
per cent confidence interval range: 0.947—1.160). This was also the case for living 
environment deprivation decile (95 per cent confidence interval range: 0.888—1.101), which 
was weakly correlated with composite score decile (r = 0.347). Predicted probabilities for each 
domain’s deciles can be found in appendix figure 1. 
 
Table 5: Comparison of IMD Domain effect sizes with 95% confidence intervals 
 





Indices of Multiple Deprivation 0.842 0.75 0.944 
Income Deprivation 0.882 0.786 0.990 
Employment Deprivation  0.887 0.796 0.989 
Education, Skills & Training Deprivation  0.822 0.739 0.915 
Health Deprivation  0.847 0.759 0.944 
Crime  0.884 0.790 0.989 
Barriers to Housing & Services 1.048 0.947 1.160 
Living Environment Deprivation 0.989 0.888 1.101 
Income Deprivation Affecting Children Index  0.860 0.765 0.968 
Income Deprivation Affecting Older People Index  0.977 0.867 1.101 
    








IMPLICATIONS FOR CHILD WELFARE 
 
This study suggests that both greater expenditure on preventative services and lower levels of 
deprivation are associated with higher likelihoods of a positive quality inspection outcomes. 
The findings challenge existing literature and dominant policy narratives in England from the 
NAO and Ofsted concerning the association between supply- and demand-side determinants 
of child welfare interventions and children’s services quality. Greater funding of services that 
address universal or emerging needs is associated with increased likelihood of positive quality 
assessments (Bywaters, et al., 2018; Yousafzai, 2020). In contrast, higher spending on activities 
Barriers to Housing & Services Deprivation IMD Domain Decile
Living Environment Deprivation IMD Domain Decile
Income Deprivation Affecting Older People Index Decile
Employment Deprivation IMD Domain Decile
Crime Deprivation IMD Domain Decile
Income Deprivation IMD Domain Decile
Income Deprivation Affecting Children Index Decile
Health Deprivation IMD Domain Decile
Indices of Multiple Deprivation Decile
Education, Skills & Training Deprivation IMD Domain Decile
0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1
Exponentiated Effect Estimate
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related to child protection investigations and plans was not associated with better odds of a 
positive inspection.  
The rising numbers of children in the care system in Britain has been described as a ‘crisis’ 
(House of Commons Library, 2018). Globally, rates of child maltreatment pose enormous 
moral and public health concerns (Sethi, et al., 2013). Mass seperation of children from their 
birth families, and institutionalisation in the care system (van IJzendoorn, et al., 2020; 
Goldman, et al., 2020), are neither sustainable solutions nor do they do justice to the rights of 
children and the rights of parents when such outcomes could have been avoided with the 
provision of adequate state support. High-quality children’s services are essential; and access 
to them should be equitable. Coordinated preventive and early help-focused approaches to 
social care services are needed to ensure the quality of services to address child maltreatment 
and reduce health inequalities (Sethi, et al., 2013; Goldman, et al., 2020; Yousafzai, 2020).  
However, these services are not a replacement for a welfare system that adequately supports 
families’ material needs, ensuring they have a decent income, secure housing in good repair, 
and access to employment. For children’s services to be ‘good’ they need to be embedded 
within a society that provides the necessary infrastructure for family life. Sustained inattention 
to poverty in public policy, and budgets that continue to create shortfalls in local authority 
finances, create conditions where adequately funding preventative services becomes 
impossible. This is likely to both increase the prevelance of risks to children’s health and 
wellbeing and reduce the capacity of local children’s services to respond to such risks (Hood, 
2015; Bywaters, et al., 2018).  
The lack of association between the ‘Barriers to Housing and Services’ deprivation domain 
deciles and Ofsted outcomes may raise doubts about the potential of greater service provision. 
It should be clarified that this measure largely captures physical distance-related barriers to 
access of universal services (primary schools, GPs surgeries) and amenities (post offices and 
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supermarkets) rather than ‘access’ in a more holistic sense. The conflation of housing quality 
with these physical distance measures may also be unhelpful. Similarly, the Living 
Environment deprivation domain includes not only housing condition but air quality and road 
traffic incidence rates. Notwithstanding their nomenclature, results from models using these 
domains may tentatively suggest that greater surveillance of children, either through proximity 
to services commonly engaged with the referral of children to social services or through greater 
public surveillence approximated by indicators of urbanisation, is not associated with more 
positive Ofsted outcomes.  
 
CONSEQUENCES FOR PUBLIC SERVICES AND POLICY 
Some forms of additional ‘supply’ are associated with better service quality, whereas others 
are not; this may help explain previous findings of no association between public expenditure 
and quality. Greater investment in social work child protection, funded through safeguarding 
spending that has been relatively stable since 2010 (Webb & Bywaters, 2018), appears to be 
no guarantee of quality if a great many of the families are living in poverty, and if the local 
authority does not have adequately resourced family support services. This may reflect ‘failure 
demand’ in children’s services (Munro, 2010; Hood, 2015; Hood, et al., 2020a) – demand 
arising from a failure to address a need earlier in its emergence – when faced with diminished 
support options and socioeconomic adversity. The ‘revolving front-door’ of children’s social 
care, characterised in England by rates of re-referrals and repeat child protection plans that can 
escalate into care entry (Hood, et al., 2016), highlights the very real consequences of failure 
demand.  
This analysis shows an ‘inverse care law’ at work in children’s services quality, comparable to 
the inverse care law in access to medical services (Tudor Hart, 1971). The most deprived local 
communities with the greatest needs are least likely to have access to good quality children’s 
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services. Reducing poverty directly may result in operational benefits for children’s services 
by addressing demand that could be managed through adequate income, housing, and 
employment. This can, in return, increase the availability of preventative support. However, 
research into child welfare inequalities has found that lower regional deprivation may adversely 
affect equity in intervention rates, particularly where income inequality is high (Webb, et al., 
2020). As such, policy responses must also carefully address the inequitable distribution of 
resources across society at multiple levels of geography (Bywaters, et al., 2018; Webb & 
Bywaters, 2018; Webb, et al., 2020). 
Access to early help and support when a child’s health or development is at risk is a legal right 
in England; families and children not getting the support they need when they need it is a 
signifier of poor-quality services, according to Ofsted and to parents (Gupta & Blumhardt, 
2016; Ofsted, 2020). The fact that local variations in early help expenditure and levels of 
deprivation are so strongly associated with Ofsted outcomes raises serious questions about how 
inspectors of children’s services contextualise and interrogate their own appraisals. This is 
apparent in the inspection reports themselves. In Hood, Nilsson, & Habibi’s (2019) analysis of 
sixty Ofsted reports, stratified by deprivation, rating, and rurality, contexts of funding and 
poverty were absent.  
Lastly, there are important implications for social policy and the ‘take over’ of local services 
in England and Wales (Jones, 2019; Kim & Warner, 2021). Ofsted outcomes are not simply 
benign assessments of quality: ‘inadequate’ judgements can result in wholescale restructuring 
of local services and their governance (Stevenson, 2015; Jones, 2019; Hernandez, 2021). If the 
quality of services is, firstly, contingent firstly on pre-existing socioeconomic factors and 
national welfare policy, and, secondly, on sufficient funding for family support services, 
political decisions which defund services and exacerbate poverty are implicated in causing 
chains of events that can lead to restructuring of governance and delivery under a pretence of 
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quality improvement (Jones, 2019). Given the inequitable distribution of both poverty and 
funding, this risks creating a two-tier system of children’s services provision with differing 
forms of governance and accountability in each: one for more affluent, better-resourced 
communities, and one for deprived, under-resourced communities. 
 
STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS 
 
This study is the first, to our knowledge, to implement a methodological approach that allows 
for the assessment of predictors of inspection outcomes across multiple frameworks while 
adjusting for hierarchical dependence of errors. This enabled a greater sample size for the 
detection of smaller or multiple effects, which is critically important when considering the 
finite nature of local government data. This is the first study we know of that delineates between 
preventative and safeguarding expenditure, recognising that not all uses of funding are equal 
within complex systems like children’s services (Hood, 2015). Further, we have attempted to 
show that the association between deprivation and Ofsted outcomes found in prior research 
studies is robust across multiple domains, with exceptions among living environment 
deprivation, barriers to housing and services, and income deprivation affecting  
older people.    
A limitation of this study is its reliance on Ofsted inspection judgements as a measure of service 
quality. Others have noted Ofsted’s focus on procedure over the experiences and outcomes for 
children and families in contact with children’s services (Hood, et al., 2016; La Valle, et al., 
2016). The contextually important effects nonetheless prompt further questions about whether 
the same trends exist for quality as assessed from a child or family perspective. We remain 
unable to delineate between types of preventative spending over time and across local 
authorities using administrative data (Webb & Bywaters, 2018); children’s centres, early 
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intervention programmes, family support, and other services, we cannot say which of these are 
most associated with better service quality.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Our findings illustrate the size of socioeconomic determinants of quality in children’s services, 
challenging dominant and entrenched narratives in England that neither service funding nor 
deprivation are strong indicators of service quality (National Audit Office, 2016, 2019). They 
also add additional nuance to existing studies by introducing methods that can adjust for the 
bias associated with the incorporation of multiple frameworks. Policies which direct resources 
towards preventative spending and poverty alleviation may create overall benefits in quality 
across the children’s social care system.   
Over the last decade, investment in preventative services has declined significantly and 
unevenly (Webb & Bywaters, 2018, YMCA, 2020, Action for Children 2020). The number of 
children living in families experiencing destitution is estimated to have increased by 75 per 
cent between 2015 and 2019 (Fitzpatrick, et al. 2020). Inequalities in and incidence of child 
welfare interventions associated with deprivation have widened (Bennett, et al., 2020); this 
article highlights that the quality of child welfare services may also have suffered as a result. 
Those most in need of high quality services to prevent child maltreatment are least likely to 
have access to them. Much could be learned from policies implemented in response to 
inequitable access to medical care (Tudor Hart, 1971).  
As long as ‘inadequate’ judgements can be used to justify the ‘take over’ of services, failure to 
acknowledge and address their socioeconomic determinants raises doubts about the 
appropriateness of any restructuring of public services. Policies which tackle the deep-rooted 
issues of failure demand and inequality, which so often characterise the child welfare system, 
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are needed.  This evidence suggests that investment in financial and material support for 
families, as well as in family support services, may be an effective prescription for addressing 
these issues and improving service quality.  
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